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1. The Jason Calacanis Weblog, http://calacanis.com/?s=sarkisyan (Dec. 21, 2007, 14:07 PST)
(holding no apparent special relationship to the victim, the blogger is one of many members of the general
public commenting on the case).
2. For the purposes of this note, “Managed Care Organization” will encompass all forms of health
insurance (including HMOs) that “attempt[] not just to pay for, but also to control the cost of, health care
services.” BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 567 (5th ed. 2004).
See generally Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About “Managed Care,” 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 661 (1999).
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COST CONTAINMENT MAY HAVE A PRICE, BUT IS IT A CRIME?
ANALYZING THE BASIS FOR CRIMINALIZING MANAGED CARE
CONDUCT
Courtney Lyons Snyder*
These companies are making a killing, killing people. Shame.1
- Jason Calacanis
INTRODUCTION
A recent transplant case raises an interesting question: Should a managed
care organization (“MCO”) face criminal prosecution when a patient dies after
the MCO’s decision to deny payment for treatment?  Is providing such a legal2
cause of action the solution, or does doing so just put money into the pockets
of attorneys rather than into the hands of the injured health care consumer? As
a recent case suggests, bad publicity could be as effective a deterrent as any
criminal prosecution in changing an MCO’s behavior.
Nataline Sarkisyan was a seventeen-year-old California teenager who
died while awaiting a liver transplant for which her insurer had refused to pay.
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3. David Whelan, Does Cigna Deserve all the Blame?, FORBES, Jan. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.forbes.com/healthcare/2008/01/08/sarkisyan-cancer-insurance-biz-healthcare-cz_dw_
0107cigna.html.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Joel Zinberg, Op-Ed, Edwards’ Evil Insurance Scam: Twisting Tragedy of Dead
Liver Girl, N.Y. POST, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/01102008/postopinion/
opedcolumnists/edwards_evil_insurance_scam_797339.htm (discussing that liver failure following a bone
marrow transplant usually results from “veno-occlusive disease or graft-versus-host disease”). 
6. Compare Whelan, supra note 3 (stating that the insurance coverage was through Nataline’s
mother’s employer), with Zinberg, supra note 5 (stating that the insurance coverage was through Nataline’s
father’s employer).
7. Whelan, supra note 3. Whelan also discusses that Sarkisyan’s doctors appealed the decision,
arguing that “Sarkisyan would have a 65% chance of surviving for six months after the liver transplant,
based on studies of similar patients” and that she “had an 85% chance of avoiding a recurrence of cancer
because of the successful bone marrow transplant.” Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (“Though the company still believed it was experimental, it would pay out of its own pocket
(not that of Nataline Sarkisyan’s mother’s employer) for the procedure.”). See generally Corrine P. Parver
& Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Liable: Assessing Liability Under a Managed
Health Care System, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1999) (“Frequently, HMOs and other third party payors
deny payment for experimental treatments, like bone marrow transplants, as not medically necessary
because of their overall unproven success rate in general treatment.” However, “[t]he meaning of ‘medically
necessary’ has been debated by scholars and courts alike, without any clear answer.”). For a discussion of
self-insured plans see infra note 95.
Sarkisyan began suffering from leukemia, a cancer of the blood, at the age of
fourteen and went into remission soon after her initial treatment.  In 2007, at3
the age of seventeen, her cancer relapsed, and she received a bone marrow
transplant from her brother in November of that year.  Despite putting her4
cancer back into remission, a blood-clotting complication from the bone
marrow transplant caused her liver to fail, and she was put on life support.  On5
December 10th, her oncologist and four members of the organ transplant
department at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) made the
first liver transplant request of CIGNA HealthCare (“CIGNA”), the insurer of
one of Sarkisyan’s parents.  The following day CIGNA denied payment for6
the transplant, allegedly stating that Nataline was “too sick for the surgery to
work,” thus deeming it experimental.7
On December 20, 2007, under national media scrutiny as a result of
protests outside of its Glendale, California office, CIGNA remarkably
reversed its initial decision and approved payment for the transplant.  In doing8
so, CIGNA effectively decided to pay for the transplant out of its pocket, as
“experimental treatments” were not covered under Sarkisyan’s employer’s
plan.  However, CIGNA’s decision to reverse its initial determination came9
too late. The Sarkisyan family had already removed their daughter from life
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10. Whelan, supra note 3.
11. Cancer Girl’s Lawyer Blames CIGNA For Her Death, CBS2.COM, Dec. 20, 2007,
http://cbs2.com/local/nataline.sarkisyan.CIGNA.2.615167.html. But cf. Zinberg, supra note 5 (“Sarkisyans’
insurer authorized payment for three years of treatment for Nataline, including an expensive bone-marrow
transplant.”).
12. See Zinberg, supra note 5 (discussing that physicians and the public have “good reason” to
dislike medical insurers because of their routine denial of claims and treatments and their general
bureaucracy).
13. Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2001).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 2 (discussing that ERISA
preempts state law for self-insured plans.); Allen D. Allred & Don L. Daniel, Upon Further Review: Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Organization Liability, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 309, 312-13 (2003) (“[V]irtually all privately employed Americans who receive health benefits as part
of their employment are covered by an ERISA plan.”); Parver & Martinez, supra note 9, at 227 (“Claims
based on a decision to deny or limit coverage generally are preempted under ERISA.”); W. Devin Resides,
Note, Holding HMO’s Liable in the New Millennium: New Theories With An Old Twist, 27 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 419, 437 (2002) (“ERISA bars two traditional types of recovery available in tort actions,
compensatory and punitive damages.”). But see Travis J. Ketterman, The Supreme Court Endorses the
Right to Second Opinions for HMO Participants, 91 ILL. B.J. 66, 71 (2003) (“[M]edical necessity decisions
are both medical-care and policy-coverage decisions. Because these decisions are in both classes, they are
not preempted by ERISA.”).
15. Allred & Daniel, supra note 14, at 313.
support, and she died later that day.  The attorney for the Sarkisyan family10
has since threatened to bring murder or manslaughter charges against CIGNA
because, in his words, the insurer did not want to “take the after-care
coverage” and in deciding to deny treatment for this reason had “maliciously
killed” the girl.11
The public outcry from this case and the public bias against “greedy”
insurers may be what is prompting the criminal liability threat.  Managed care12
has become the new lead paint, tobacco, and gun manufacturer—it is a
completely legal industry that is increasingly unpopular with the public.13
Unlike those industries, however, civil suits against MCOs face an additional
hurdle: ERISA preemption.  As a consequence, a plaintiff’s damages have14
been limited to reimbursement for expenses, which has been unsatisfactory for
many, especially those who have lost loved ones due to treatment denial.15
Though criminal sanctions would not solve the remedies issue, it could
provide the punitive and deterrent aspects for which there seems to have been
so much public outcry.
This Note explores the logic behind healthcare insurers’ seemingly
criminal exempt status, including situations when treatment delay and denial
is almost certain to result in death for the insured, and why criminal
prosecution is not the answer to the current healthcare debate. The events
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16. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
18. See Allred & Daniel, supra note 14, at 309-10.
19. See id. at 313.
20. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
21. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004); see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211, 228 (2000) (“[P]ure ‘eligibility decisions’ turn on the plan’s coverage of a particular condition or
medical procedure for its treatment. ‘Treatment decisions,’ by contrast, are choices about how to go about
diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition: given a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the
appropriate medical response?”).
surrounding Nataline Sarkisyan’s death are outlined above for purposes of
showing the sensitive nature of such cases and the strong public reaction
against the insurer. This paper does not purport to determine whether criminal
charges would be warranted in CIGNA’s case since many of the facts are in
dispute. Part I will explore why a move toward criminal prosecutions seems
almost inevitable in light of ERISA’s limitations on damages and the public
response to the healthcare crisis. Part II will look at why criminal homicide
charges against a healthcare insurer seem unlikely to succeed, and Part III will
examine why such prosecutions are not the solution to the current healthcare
debate. Finally, Part IV will postulate why and how Congress should step in
to fill ERISA’s gaping holes.
I. THE MOVEMENT FROM CIVIL TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. ERISA
In the past, most disputes against insurers were made via a state law
complaint in tort.  However, with the evolution of the federal Employee16
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in 1974, many of these cases were
removed to federal court under the preemption clause.  This preemption17
signaled a victory for the managed care industry, which once faced potentially
ruinous damages exposure under state law.  Remedies under ERISA are18
limited to the cost of the denied treatment, and typically there is no remedy at
all if a patient dies as a result of a treatment denial by an MCO.19
For a period of time the Supreme Court seemed to cut back on ERISA
preemption.  Nevertheless, in the consolidated cases of Aetna Health Inc. v.20
Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. v. Calad, the Court ruled that
ERISA completely preempts state law causes of action for wrongful denial of
benefits that involve “pure eligibility decisions.”  In these cases, a participant21
and a beneficiary sued their respective Health Maintenance Organizations
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22. Davila, 542 U.S. at 220-21.
23. Allred & Daniel, supra note 14, at 311.
24.  Jensen, supra note 13, at 1347; see also Maura F. Forde, Note, Jones v. Chicago HMO: The
Illinois Supreme Court Gives the HMO Industry A Rude Awakening, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 512 (2001)
(discussing how the media exacerbates the problem by bringing delay and denial “horror stories” to the
attention of the public). See generally Linda Peeno, Managed Care and the Corporate Practice of
Medicine, TRIAL, Feb. 2000, at 18 (considering the severe “lack of ethical, legal, and safety” safeguards
for patients, it is “little wonder” that managed care has outraged our country).
25. Jensen, supra note 13, at 1348-49.
26. Id. at 1347-48.
27. Id. at 1348.
(“HMOs”) for failure to exercise ordinary care when the HMOs denied certain
treatments and services recommended by their treating physicians in violation
of a Texas statute. The Court held that ERISA completely preempted the state
cause of action because (a) any legal duty under the state statute arose from
the administration of an ERISA-regulated plan and (b) the HMOs were
denying payment based on eligibility under the plan, not as physicians or
employers of physicians.  Thus it appears that the Court has moved back22
toward the recognition that many treatment decisions made by an MCO are
pure eligibility decisions preempted by ERISA. Similarly, in Sarkisyan’s case,
CIGNA, acting as the administrator for the employer’s self-funded plan, made
an eligibility determination based on plan coverage, and ERISA would have
likely preempted any state law tort claim. Sarkisyan’s family would therefore
be limited to reimbursement for any treatment wrongfully denied, a useless
remedy to a family who has just lost a daughter due to that denial.
B. Other Factors Leading the Movement
All things considered, managed care litigation may indeed be “the
tobacco litigation of the turn of the century.”  It is clear that public favor of23
managed care is low, but how the industry got to such a state is less certain.24
Managed care initially developed as a response to rising health care costs in
the 1980s.  Corporations that had been induced to provide health care to25
employees by labor organizations in the 1950s became faced with increasing
healthcare costs that were a huge drain on their resources.  Complicating the26
problem was the attitude of employees, many of whom soon came to expect
that their employers would provide affordable health care as a benefit of
employment.  Moreover, physicians, who essentially controlled the entire27
system, received payment for each test they ran or each drug they prescribed,
which led to patient over-treatment, increased costs, and a resulting
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28. Id. at 1349.
29. Id. (providing that this new system is known as “capitation”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed
Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 297-98 (1995).
33. Jensen, supra note 13, at 1350.
34. As opposed to retrospective review, where an insurer denies payment for care already provided,
preprocedure or preservice review occurs prior to a procedure or service to determine whether that service
is medically necessary or experimental, and thus not covered by the plan. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at
627.
35. Statement from Jeffrey Kang, M.D., M.P.H., Chief Medical Officer, CIGNA HealthCare, to
Employees and the Media (Dec. 31, 2007), available at http://newsroom.cigna.com/article_
display.cfm?article_id=840.
36. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 628.
overburden on employers who had to try and manage those costs but who had
no expertise to do so.28
Under the new managed care scheme, physicians receive a flat fee to
cover all patient care.  Such a fee system aligns physician interests with those29
of the employers rather than the patients and removes the physicians’ control
over the healthcare system.  Whereas the prior system encouraged over-30
treatment, the current managed care system arguably encourages physicians
to under-treat; physicians who order fewer tests or prescribe fewer drugs can
keep the entire fee received from the managed care entity.  Under a managed31
care scheme, there are still Preferred Provider Networks that work under the
traditional fee-for-service model, but the more modern trend is toward the
capitation system.32
Possibly the most polarizing feature of managed care is its system of
utilization review to cut costs. “Managed care reviewers,” who in some cases
are not even doctors, usually work for the managed care entity and often end
up determining what treatment the patient actually receives.  In Sarkisyan’s33
case, CIGNA employed pre-procedure or pre-service review to determine
whether Sarkisyan’s employer should cover the liver transplant.  The34
determination was made using medical evidence like the guidelines provided
by the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases and the
American Society of Transplantation, and internal and independent external
review by physician transplant experts.  Though utilization review decisions35
are essentially coverage decisions—making a determination as to whether a
treatment is experimental and not covered under the plan—they are also
inherently medical decisions, “because in most instances they determine
whether or not the insured will receive medical treatment.”  Many saw the36
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37. Jensen, supra note 13, at 1350.
38. Id. at 1351.
39. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 392 (stating that “medical professionals are in a position
of dominance with regard to their patients [because] the physician has superior knowledge [and] expertise
. . . . Patients are thus vulnerable . . .”); see also Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1851 (1994) (discussing that the medical culture of perfection and infallibility creates incentives for
physicians to cover up medical errors).
40. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 85 (2008). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 502-06 (3d ed. 2001) (defining criminal homicide).
41. See John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1975) (defining guilt of homicide by omission as requiring the following: (1) a
legal duty to protect another; (2) a failure to act combined with knowledge or gross negligence; and (3) that
such failure be the proximate cause of the death). Robertson continues analyzing criminal liability for
homicide by omission, explaining, “if the omission is intentional the person can be prosecuted for first-or
second-degree murder depending on the extent of his premeditation and deliberation.” Id. at 217-18.
injection of this element into the mix as an invasion of the sanctity of the
patient-doctor relationship.37
Despite the criticisms, managed care achieved what employers and
society had set out for by keeping health care costs down.  Yet it is this cost-38
containment focus and for-profit feature that has also prompted such public
scorn. Society does not want financial prowess or wherewithal to influence or
impact its health. Anyone facing a health crisis would certainly hope to have
access to the best treatments available, regardless of cost. The reality,
however, is that healthcare resources are scarce and that treatment often
imposes large costs that someone must pay.
Furthermore, the lack of transparency in the healthcare industry itself
prompts fear in the hearts of patients who rely on a physician’s expertise and
knowledge.  That is to say, the fact that physicians are conflicted over patient39
treatment because of financial disincentives in an industry that many lay
people do not understand has caused many to point the finger at the industry
deemed responsible for this breakdown—the managed care industry itself.
II. THE RISE OF THE CRIMINAL CASE?
Criminal homicide results from either one’s intentional acts that result in
death, the conscious disregard of the high probability that one’s actions will
cause death, or the failure to act to prevent death when action is required.  It40
would seem that an MCO’s denial of life-saving treatment when such
treatment is required fits squarely within the third definition, namely, an
omission punishable as criminal homicide.  So why have criminal prosecutors41
failed to target the managed care industry? Problems with the essential
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42. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (Official Draft 1962) (“[A] duty to perform the omitted
act is otherwise imposed by law.”); see also Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(“[F]inding of legal duty is the critical element of the crime charged.”).
43. Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About Bad Samaritan Laws, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 971, 976 (2000). There are generally three other circumstances when the law invokes a duty
to act: (1) when there is a “special relationship” such as between a parent and child; (2) when a person
creates a risk for another and then fails to prevent that harm; or (3) when a person who has no legal duty
to act voluntarily comes to the aid of another but fails to provide further aid or assistance and, as a result
of this failure to act, puts the at-risk individual in a worse position than if no assistance had been
undertaken. Id. at 975-76.
44. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 547, 557
(1988).
45. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (baby-sitter guilty of homicide
for failure to feed infant); State v. Brown, 631 P.2d 129, 131-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (nursing home
operator under duty to feed and care for patient); People v. Montecino, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (Cal. 1944) (home-
care nurse under duty to provide or obtain necessary medical care for patient in her care).
46. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 576-80.
47. See Robertson, supra note 41, at 226.
48. See id.
49. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 32, at 302 (maintaining that HMO-established utilization
management programs can impact the control element necessary to establish contractual liability).
elements of homicide by omission, along with difficulties in handling the
tension between the public benefit and the societal discontent with the
industry, seriously complicate the situation and decrease the likelihood that
such prosecution would be successful.
A. Duty
In the case of criminal homicide by omission, there must be a legal duty
to act.  Such a duty exists through express or implied contract, such as when42
a doctor agrees to care for her patient.  Once the contract to provide services43
exists, the provider has an “obligation to perform those services properly.”44
Thus, courts have imposed criminal liability when the failure to provide
services leads to death.  As the insurer of the subscriber, the insurer’s legal45
duty to the insured arguably arises out of contract principles as well.  Even46
though the contract may be one entered into between the employer and the
insurer, a duty on the part of the MCO may arise if the insured is considered
a third party beneficiary to the contract.  Similar to hospital administrators47
who are under a contractual obligation with the hospital to assure that the
health and safety of third party beneficiary patients are protected, MCOs
would seem to be under a contractual obligation with the employer to manage
the care of the insureds.  The more control an MCO exerts over the physician,48
the more established the MCO’s duty to the subscriber.  Even in CIGNA’s49
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50. See id.
51. Kang, supra note 35.
52. Id.
53. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 572 (“Health insurance essentially involves transferring risk
from those insureds, who account for most of health care costs, to low-risk insureds, who pay most of the
premiums, through the medium of the insurer.”); see also Zinberg, supra note 5 (“Insurers are obliged to
preserve resources to pay for subscribers’ medical needs. That is, they need to direct a limited pool of cash
to treatments most likely to work. If they pay for lots of unproven, experimental, expensive procedures . . .
they have less left to pay for proven therapies for other patients.”).
54. Robertson, supra note 41, at 235.
55. Id.
case, where the MCO “merely” made coverage determinations based on plan
provisions, the company’s use of utilization management certainly impacted
the actual treatment Ms. Sarkisyan received.  Nevertheless, whether this50
contract between an MCO and the insured party truly exists may not be as
clear as it seems.
Often, as in the case of Nataline Sarkisyan, where the MCO entered into
an Administrative Services Only (“ASO”) contract with the employer, the
MCO “provides administrative services and coordinates clinical procedures,
including determining if a plan covers a specific, proposed treatment.”  As51
an administrator, an express contract exists between the MCO and the
employer, but not between the MCO and the insured. Furthermore, the insurer,
like CIGNA in this case, does not fund or pay for the clinical care: the
employer does.  In order to serve its client—the self-funded employer—the52
insurer must administer the plan according to the employer’s specifications.
Thus, any duty owed by the MCO to the insured may be limited to the express
terms of the contract, which often contain numerous exceptions. Because of
its risk pooling function, all types of insurance carve out exceptions to lower
the overall risk and to ensure that there are enough financial resources to
provide for all of its covered beneficiaries.53
If the insurance contract has these exceptions, usually in the form of
numerous carve-outs for experimental treatments, an MCO may argue that the
“level of necessary care becomes extraordinary in the case of experimental
treatments.”  There is little case law on point regarding the standard of care54
an insurer might owe to an insured with respect to the nuances of the plan, but
typically, “an individual is required to provide only the level of care that
society may reasonably expect, given the risk, available means, and likelihood
of benefit in the precise circumstances facing the actor.”  To complicate55
things further, in reality most contracts do not define the term “medical
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56. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 629-30 (discussing the problems with defining medical
necessity). CIGNA’s Chief Medical Officer would likely reply that there is no such taint in Sarkisyan’s
case, as CIGNA did not fund and was not financially responsible for payments under the plan. See Kang,
supra note 35. However, CIGNA does have a financial incentive to retain the business of its often large
corporate clients, and saving those clients money almost certainly plays a role in CIGNA retaining that
business.
57. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
58. Id. at 486.
59. Id. at 491.
60. Scott Gottlieb, Opinion, Edwards and Organ Transplants, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120001235968882563.html.
61. Id.
62. Kang, supra note 35 (citing to the transplant list at http://www.unos.org and the liver transplant
list at http://www.optn.org/data/).
63. See supra Part I.B (discussing capitation system and utilization review); see also FURROW ET
necessity” and therefore exceptions and denials can seem arbitrary and
clouded with the possible taint of financial motivations.56
An example of ordinary versus extraordinary care can be found in Barber
v. Superior Court.  The state of California charged an internist and a surgeon57
with homicide for allowing a comatose patient to die by withholding his
intravenous nourishment.  The court dismissed the charges, holding that the58
doctors were not under a legal duty to continue providing life-sustaining fluids
where “there was no reasonable chance that further treatment would provide
the patient with benefits that outweighed the treatment’s burdens.”59
By providing experimental treatments outside the scope of the plan to a
few sick insureds, the insurer takes money away from the relatively healthy
patients, thus diminishing the funds available to the general pool. As in the
case of Ms. Sarkisyan, “[i]deally, everyone who can benefit from an organ
transplant would receive one . . . [,] [b]ut with more patients than available
organs, some form of allocation procedure involving administrative judgments
is inevitable.”  The insurer fills this role by making the judgment call through60
its reading of the employer’s health insurance contract and through medical
expertise.  Acknowledging that experimental treatments “are a complex61
social issue,” Jeffrey Kang, CIGNA’s Chief Medical Officer, went on to say
that “[t]ransplants are especially complex [determinations] given the scarcity
of organs themselves . . . [;] there are more than 98,000 people waiting for an
organ transplant—nearly 17,000 specifically for liver transplants.”62
The MCO’s advisory role is an extremely important one when health
resources are scarce. MCOs contain costs through various methods, including
utilization review, the capitation system, and provider networks, among
others.  In fact, in Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court, noting the nature63
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AL., supra note 2, at 571 (discussing different provider networks).
64. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220 (2000). The Court elaborated further when it said, “No
HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment
rationing.” Id.
65. Id.
66. See Riser v. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 620 So. 2d 372, 378 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (where a patient died
as a result of a procedure that would have had “no practicable benefit to the patient”); see also AVEDIS
DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT (EXPLORATIONS IN
QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING, VOL. 1) 6-7 (1980) (“[P]roviding excessive care to some [leaves
less for] society to offer to others who may need it more” and such “redundant care, even when it is
harmless, indicates carelessness, poor judgment, or ignorance”); Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need
to Improve Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1000 (1998) (“Poor quality care can be caused by
underuse, overuse, or misuse.”).
67. Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Family Who Sued H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at
A1.
68. Id.
69. Id. Utilization review is the MCO’s process of determining the necessity of medical care on a
case by case basis in order to contain costs by eliminating unnecessary, and thus wasteful, care. FURROW
ET AL., supra note 2, at 627.
of an HMO’s risk-pooling and economic function, ruled that under ERISA,
treatment decisions made by the HMO do not need to be solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries.  HMOs, according to the Pegram Court,64
were free to continue using physician incentives and treatment rationing
through utilization review.  Though ERISA applies only to civil suits, this65
language may impact the duty analysis in criminal contexts in light of the
unique role that for-profit MCOs play in the healthcare environment.
Utilization review and other MCO practices work not only to control
costs but also to provide better quality. There is evidence that more treatment
is not necessarily better treatment.  Dr. David Eddy, a health economist with66
Duke University, commented on a 1993 California civil case that produced an
$89.3 million award for the family of a woman denied an experimental
treatment for the breast cancer that ultimately killed her.  He expressed his67
concern that if the “[award was] interpreted to mean that investigational
procedures should be covered, that is a disaster, not just for the cost of health
care but also for the quality of health care.”  An MCO’s primary function in68
using utilization review is to avoid harmful treatments by providing a barrier
to such unproven treatments.69
This tension between more treatment and better treatment complicates the
duty analysis. Does the insurer have a duty to provide more treatment or to
provide what is considered the better treatment? In the case of Nataline
Sarkisyan, CIGNA deemed the transplant unproven in its medical benefit and
ineffective as treatment and thus recommended that her parent’s employer not
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70. Gottlieb, supra note 60.
71. Id.; see also Kang, supra note 35.
72. Id.
73. Leavens, supra note 44, at 555.
74. Id. at 556.
75. See supra Part II.
76. See DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 182-83 (stipulating that conduct is considered the actual cause
of a particular result if the result would not have happened in the absence of such conduct; this requirement
is commonly referred to as the “but for” test); see also People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660,
665-66 (N.Y. 1980) (citing People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E. 2d 773, 776 (N.Y. 1974), in which the court held
that there was no criminal liability for employee deaths in a plant explosion because “the defendants’
actions must be a sufficiently direct cause” of the death); Leavens, supra note 44 (“[T]he law differentiates
among the many possible ‘but for’ causal forces, identifying some as ‘necessary conditions’—necessary
for the result to occur but not its direct ‘cause’—and recognizing others as the ‘direct’ or ‘proximate’ cause
of the result.”).
77. Peter T. Edelman, Corporate Criminal Liability For Homicide: The Need to Punish Both the
Corporate Entity and its Officers, 92 DICK. L. REV. 193, 210 (1987).
cover the procedure.  After an appeal and an internal review, CIGNA sought70
external review by an oncologist and transplant surgeon.  These experts71
allegedly agreed that the transplant exceeded appropriate risk and that benefits
were not supported by medical literature.72
Further complicating the duty analysis is that a duty arising from a
contract in the civil arena is not necessarily analogous to the duty owed in a
criminal context.  Some have suggested that criminal liability be limited to73
where there is a duty aimed at “preserving life.”  This duty is more easily74
attributable to physicians and less likely to apply to managed care entities who
must manage care in order to preserve resources for all beneficiaries.
Moreover, it is entirely unclear what constitutes a life preserving duty and
when one has such a duty. Even if an insurer has a duty to preserve life, it may
not have a legal duty to pay for any unproven measure that might preserve life.
In homicide-by-omission crimes, the action that one failed to take must have
been one that was required, not merely one that was foregone.  The scope of75
the duty to preserve life is therefore somewhat ambiguous.
B. Causation
In addition to the legal duty to act, another essential element of homicide
by omission is causation. The causation element required in a criminal case
is more than just the actual (or “but for”) causation required in civil cases.76
Even if the omission is the actual cause of the harm, it must also be the
proximate (or “legal”) cause of the result.  Proximate cause requires77
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79. The law of proximate cause thus attributes causal responsibility for a criminal harm to some acts
but not others even though the harm in question could only have resulted from all of the conduct taken
together. See id. at 210-11; see also State v. Cox, 351 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Idaho 1960) (holding that the
victim’s death was causally attributed to the defendant driver who put the victim in peril and not the
physician who treated the victim less than skillfully); People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776-77 (N.Y. 1974)
(holding that the fact that the victim was struck and killed by a truck did not relieve the defendant of the
direct causation attributable to him for leaving the drunken robbery victim on an icy road late at night);
Leavens, supra note 44, at 564 (“While much of proximate cause analysis has been framed in language that
rings of actual or physical causation, this inquiry is hardly objective.”).
80. Leavens, supra note 44, at 565.
81. Id. at 572.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 572-73.
foreseeability of “each particular event . . . leading up to the ultimate result.”78
Though this seems simple enough, the way the law evaluates which forces are
the proximate cause is not always entirely objective or clear.  The analysis79
becomes further complicated when deciding “whether and to what extent a
failure to act is the legal cause of a harm.”80
In determining what force is the proximate cause of the resulting harm,
the typical and simplest scenario falls into the “physical cause and effect
model.”  Such a paradigm consists of an identifiable physical force acting to81
change the current state of affairs.  In cases of omissions, the cause and effect82
relationship is somewhat less clear because one simply allows the status quo
to continue.  Thus, although an actor may indeed be the “but for” cause of the83
harm, so are many other actors or forces.  For example, in the case where an84
MCO fails to treat a sick patient who ultimately dies, it can be said that “but
for” the MCO’s failure to pay for the treatment, that patient would have lived.
It can also be said, however, that “but for” the original illness the patient
would have lived without requiring the treatment at all. In Nataline
Sarkisyan’s case, many factors could have been the “but for” cause of her
death: although being taken off life support was the final physical push closest
in time to her death, complications from her bone marrow transplant put her
in the coma, which prompted doctors to put her on life support. Furthermore,
her initial leukemia treatment was what had required the bone marrow
transplant in the first place. It is obvious that the denial of the liver transplant
fits somewhere in the causal analysis but it is unclear how much of a role it
actually played.
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85. Id. at 573.
86. Id.
87. Id. Leavens states the following example:
When, for example, a driver parks a car on a steep hill, it is normal to set the parking brake and
put the car in gear. If the driver forgets to do so and the car subsequently rolls down the hill,
smashing into another car, we would say that the failure to park properly was a departure from
the status quo. This failure, not the visibly steep hill or the predicate act of pulling the car to the
curb, was the cause of the collision.
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (“In the [earlier] example, the driver’s failure to park the car in a proper manner caused the
accident as surely as if he had actually driven his car into the other.”); see also supra text accompanying
note 79 (examining the legal cause of harm).
90. Leavens, supra note 44, at 573.
91. Robertson, supra note 41, at 237; see also 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 19 (“It is equally well
settled that the consequences of an act which is the efficient cause of the death of another are not excused,
nor is the criminal responsibility for causing death lessened, by the pre-existing physical condition of the
person killed, at the time the act was done. . . .”).
92. See supra text accompanying note 7.
93. Robertson, supra note 41, at 237.
Professor Arthur Leavens argues that such a view of causation is too
limited and thus is fundamentally flawed.  The status quo, he says,85
encompasses much more than just the state of affairs prior to and immediately
after the omission.  It includes “expected patterns of conduct, including86
actions designed to avert certain unwanted results.”  Failure to take action to87
avoid such results should also be seen as disturbing the status quo.  “When88
such a failure to act is a necessary condition (a “but for” cause) of a particular
harm, then that failure fairly can be said to cause that harm.”  Leavens89
maintains that omissions do indeed fall into the cause-and-effect model.90
According to such a view, an insurer who fails to pay for a preventative
treatment that might prolong life would be said to proximately cause the
ensuing death as long as payment for that treatment is expected. Societal
expectations notwithstanding, the contract between the MCO and the
employer often excludes certain treatments from coverage, often by only
offering to cover that which is deemed to be “medically necessary.”
The law seems to agree with Leavens. Most courts have decided that
accelerating any death is criminally punishable.  In the CIGNA scenario, the91
denied treatment potentially could have prolonged life for a significant period
of time.  Thus, CIGNA would hardly be able to argue that Sarkisyan was92
going to die anyway because of her pre-existing condition. “As the period
shortens, however, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary duties
of care becomes relevant.”  Failing to provide “extraordinary care” (care that93
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96. Robertson, supra note 41, at 238.
97. See Whelan, supra note 3 (stating, “It’s not enough for the insurer to deny coverage . . . . The
doctors and the hospital—especially a nonprofit institution like UCLA—must decline to work for free.”).
98. Robertson, supra note 41, at 238.
99. Id. at 237 (saying that a defendant generally has two defenses to the causation argument).
100. Id. at 238.
would result in only “a few days or hours [more] of existence”) may not be
criminally culpable even though it may hasten death.  Again, how much time94
is required before one is “preserving life” has not been delineated.
In the typical managed care scenario, the MCO simply makes the decision
as to whether the insurer, or the employer in a self-insured plan, will pay for
the treatment.  This determination is made based on the terms of the95
insurance contract and whether a particular treatment is “covered.” The
patient’s doctors, and sometimes the hospital caring for the patient, also play
a role and owe a duty to the patient. A common defense to the issue of
causation is therefore “that the omission of a particular defendant should not
legally be considered the cause of [a patient’s] death because the patient
would not have died had the other persons with a duty of care fulfilled their
obligations to him.”  In the case of Nataline Sarkisyan, though CIGNA denied96
payment for the experimental treatment, the doctors who were pushing for it
could have simply provided the treatment and dealt with the issue of payment
later.  The omission of the doctors could be viewed as a “sufficiently97
independent intervening cause to break the causal link between the
defendant’s act and the resulting death.”98
Professor Robertson argues that there are two problems with the
intervening cause argument.  Though a defendant’s omission may not be a99
sufficient condition of a patient’s death, it may be a necessary condition. In
Sarkisyan’s case, CIGNA’s “payment” denial was not an actual “treatment”
denial and thus not an independently sufficient cause of her death. It was only
because her doctors failed to provide the treatment in the first place that the
resulting harm occurred. Robertson goes on to argue that even with merely
necessary (and not sufficient) causation, those who fail to act should
nevertheless be assigned legal causation.  The law in this area, he says,100
“selects one or more necessary conditions as the legal cause” based on policy
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101. Id. (he suggests: “[A] bullet fired from a gun is only one of many conditions that must exist for
a human death from shooting . . . . Although firing the gun is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the
death, the law justifiably selects that act as the legal cause because the shooting is a point at which social
interventions may effectively prevent future deaths by gunfire.”).
102. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 3 (the author, questioning why the hospital did not proceed with
the transplant despite the non-payment, questioned a hospital spokesperson who cryptically said that
“[t]here have been occasions where UCLA has performed a transplant without compensation” but that
payment is always an issue for the patient anyway because of the cost of after-care).
103. Robertson, supra note 41, at 239.
104. Id. at 573.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See infra Part III; supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
108. Leavens, supra note 44, at 576 (explaining how contract law produces a regularity of
performance by formalizing and requiring particular standards of conduct).
109. Id. at 575 (suggesting that the duty in the criminal context must rely on “empirically valid
expectation[s] that persons in similar circumstances will act to prevent a harm . . . and also a deeply
determinations, such as which actor can “prevent future occurrences of that
necessary condition and thus the prohibited result.”  Furthermore, the law101
will assign causation to the actor who “reasonably foresees or expects that
others with a duty to act will not intervene,” which would here seem to be the
insurance company. The MCO, whose purpose is to keep costs down, knows
that most doctors will not treat without assurance of payment unless they are
legally required to do so.  Under Robertson’s theory, the doctors’ omission102
would not be an independent, intervening cause breaking the chain of
causation.  In fact, it seems as though the doctors’ omissions are very much103
related to the MCO’s omissions, and might even be caused thereby.
The cause-and-effect model at this stage “does not differentiate among
various persons who should engage in preventive conduct.”  In order to104
determine who should act, the law must set out what the expectations are for
each individual or corporation, and only when those individuals fail to act as
expected should it be said that the proximate cause element has been met.105
Professor Leavens goes on to urge that causation should be “sharply focused”
so that moral indignation does not play a role in assigning blame to those who
fail to act when not legally required to do so.  The concern over moral106
indignation almost certainly permeates the duty and causation analysis in the
managed care context.  Therefore, it becomes extremely important that107
expectations are rationally and objectively determined. These expectations,
operating against a backdrop of scarce healthcare resources, should reflect and
promote policy concerns while staying true to contract principles.  Thus,108
duty and proximate cause in the managed care arena are inherently
intertwined.109
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ingrained common understanding that society relies on that individual to prevent the harm”).
110. Robertson, supra note 41, at 217; see also DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 102 (describing crimes
by omission, Dressler explains that the remaining elements of the offense must be proven, including the
“requisite mens rea.”).
111. See generally Susan S. Septimus & Allison L. Spruill, The Phantom of the Corporate
Operation: Criminal Liability, HOUSTON LAWYER, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 15; see also Edelman, supra note
77, at 199 (saying that a “corporation has no mind and no soul; therefore, a mental state has no meaning
when applied to a corporation”).
112. Edelman, supra note 77, at 199.
113. Id. at 199-200.
114. See generally Gregory L. Diskant, Trial Balloon: Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 34
LITIGATION 2, Winter 2008, at 5, 6 (discussing problems with respondeat superior corporate criminal
liability).
C. Intent
To prosecute homicide by omission successfully, the person who fails to
act must do so “with knowledge or gross negligence.”  MCOs are artificial110
entities and it is therefore difficult to attribute a mental state to them.111
However, the law has held corporations criminally responsible for specific
intent crimes in the past under several theories.  Typically, a corporation is112
either responsible for (1) the acts of its employees through respondeat
superior, (2) the acts of the highest officials, or (3) “illegal conduct that results
from reckless or unreasonable conduct.”113
Though most courts agree that the requisite intent can be impugned to the
corporate entity, the approach still has its critics.  MCOs are not like other114
corporations because they often act as intermediaries and perform specific
contractual functions. The fact that the MCO may be functioning primarily for
the benefit of the employer or for the insured, or for some combination
thereof, may make it more difficult to decipher whether any of the MCO’s
agents or employees had the necessary intent to harm, since working for the
benefit of one may oftentimes necessarily harm the other. Thus, without
specific statutes or regulatory laws setting standards of conduct for MCOs
(aside from ERISA), it will be difficult to impugn the requisite criminal intent
to the insurer.
III. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS NOT THE SOLUTION
Aside from problems with fulfilling the elements of criminal homicide,
there are policy problems with expanding the criminal law to cover treatment
denials by MCOs. Criminal prosecution would represent yet another example
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115. Jensen, supra note 13.
116. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
117. Dressler, supra note 43, at 977.
118. Id. at 978.
119. Id.
120. See supra text accompanying note 97. Furthermore, Jeffrey Kang, CIGNA’s medical director,
states that the United Network for Organ Sharing, which manages organ transplant waiting lists, requires
that patients receive transplants regardless of their financial means. In response to criticism that CIGNA
denied Sarkisyan a liver, he said, “[T]he reality is we only denied paying for it.” Whelan, supra note 3.
121. Alicia Chang, Bereaved Family to Sue Insurer After Dispute Over Liver Transplant, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2007, at A2.
122. Dressler, supra note 43, at 977-78.
of “citizens and the executive branches of government [] seek[ing] restitution
and fundamental social change in the courts after losing in the legislative
arena, thus forcing the judiciary branches into the unwise and improper role
of policymaker.”  Yet, unlike other legal industries that have faced115
aggressive civil litigation and have been changed thereby (e.g., the tobacco,
lead paint, and handgun industries), the managed care industry involves
questions of federal preemption and damage limitations under ERISA, which
further induces plaintiffs to seek redress through criminal sanctions.116
Joshua Dressler sees “troubling features” in the current state of homicide-
by-omission liability.  The general homicide statute contains an active-state117
element—actus reus—that is defined as the “killing of a human being by
another human being.”  It is truly difficult to reconcile CIGNA’s actions in118
Sarkisyan’s case to this literal language. Although CIGNA may have allowed
the leukemia to kill Nataline, it performed no killing act itself. More
fundamentally, characterizing the insurer as a killer, and thereby equating its
passivity with the doctor or hospital’s passivity or with leukemia’s
uncontrollable effects, “undermines the concept of individual responsibility
and authorship of conduct.”  In Sarkisyan’s case, although her doctors were119
convinced that the transplant would benefit her, they failed to go through with
the treatment without payment.  Instead, the hospital required a down120
payment of Sarkisyan’s parents, which they failed to provide.  Though all of121
the actors seem to be culpable in some sense, the law has failed to carefully
define expectations in a situation such as Sarkisyan’s. Without such clear
standards and expectations, the law can hardly punish actors who are not
breaking the law.
Dressler analogizes to a case where a woman named Alice allowed her
boyfriend, Bob, to beat her daughter to death without doing anything to stop
him.  He suggests that Alice’s liability, if any, should be for violation of122
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126. Id.
127. Id. at 979.
128. Id. Thus, the “duty to act to make the world better” is as demanding a legal duty as the “duty
not to actively make the world worse.” Id.
129. Id. at 981.
130. Id. at 982.
131. Dressler, supra note 43, at 989.
some “less serious and narrowly defined statute that compels parents to act to
protect the well-being of their children.”  Alice should not be deemed a123
killer, he says, but may be deemed a bad parent.  Similarly, an insurer should124
be liable for breaching their obligation as an MCO, but should not be labeled
a murderer. In cases of omissions, which punish for “nothing rather than
something,” there is a need for standard, objective criteria to determine
criminal culpability.  Dressler suggests criteria such as “the status125
relationship of the parties, contractual understandings, or the suspect's
personal connection to the emergency by having created the initial risk.”126
Dressler also sees problems with the current state of “commission-by-
omission” crimes.  More specifically, he doubts the logic of equating127
“positive duties with negative ones.”  The criminal law punishes for legally128
culpable acts or non-acts, not for bad character.  “At a minimum, there is a129
serious risk that juries will inadvertently punish people for being (or seeming
to be) evil or ‘soulless,’ rather than for what occurred on a specific
occasion.”  This risk of bias is arguably even greater in the case of an MCO.130
Almost every member of society has some viewpoint about MCOs and their
proper role, yet few of those same people know the intricacies of the business
itself. Though it may seem impossible to say that the law would punish an
MCO for its “bad character” (since the MCO is not an individual, it is not
capable of having a character in the ordinary sense of the word), in reality this
is probably even more likely to happen than with an individual actor. When
an individual is accused of a crime, jury members can often empathize as
fellow human beings, recognizing human limitations and shortcomings. MCOs
are unlikely to garner any such support.
Along the same morality line, criminal liability can hardly make MCOs
virtuous. “It is worth remembering that the criminal law is not a cure for all
of our problems.”  Like litigation against the tobacco, lead paint, and131
handgun industries, managed care prosecution represents punishment for
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136. Laurel J. Harbour & Natalya Y. Johnson, Can a Corporation Commit Manslaughter? Recent
Developments in the United Kingdom and the United States, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 226, 227 (citing Stanley
S. Arkin, Corporate Guilty Plea, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 28). See generally John E. Stoner, Corporate
Criminal Liability For Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 SW. L.J. 1275
(1985).
137. Stoner, supra note 136, at 1286.
138. Diskant, supra note 114, at 6 (citing to a speech by U.S. District Court Judge, Lewis A. Kaplan,
who dismissed criminal charges against thirteen former KPMG employees in United States v. Stein, 495
F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Hon. Lewis A. Kaplan, Address to the Commercial and Federal
Litigation Section, New York State Bar Ass’n (Jan. 24, 2007), http://nysbar.com/blogs/comfed)). Many
MCOs, including CIGNA, trade stock on international exchanges.
139. Resides, supra note 14.
140. Edelman, supra note 77, at 198.
providing legal products and services.  Unlike these other industries,132
managed care serves an important societal function by rationing scarce
healthcare resources and by keeping costs low.
One would think that “the government [would] always win[] when it
chooses to charge a corporation with a crime” due to the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which imputes to the corporation any wrongdoing of an
employee.  Though this doctrine is quite useful in civil disputes, it does not133
lend itself so easily to application in the criminal context, where individuals
are typically held accountable and punished for their acts or omissions.134
Furthermore, “Congress has provided no guidance whatsoever about how to
determine which acts of which natural persons should be imputed to the
artificial ‘person’ of the corporation for purposes of determining whether it
has committed a crime.”  Many scholars argue that punishing a corporation135
criminally will not deter criminal behavior, since corporations “have no soul
to be damned and no body to be kicked.”  “The concept of a fictional136
economic entity simply does not mesh with the four goals of criminal law:
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”137
Furthermore, “[c]riminal prosecution of such [artificial beings] . . . does
not punish the wrongdoers . . . it punishes the stockholders.”  In fact, the138
policy behind placing limitations on ERISA damages is that, “because many
benefit plans are self-funded, it is the workers’ money that would pay the
damages.”  Also, since the corporation is an artificial entity, it cannot be139
incarcerated.  Therefore, large fines will replace prison sentences, and the140
impact of such penalties will “result in low dividends, fallen stock values, and
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144. Peter D. Jacobsen & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 224 (2002).
145. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying note 14.
147. Allred & Daniel, supra note 14, at 309 (citing to a statement by the President of the American
Association of Health Plans (AAHP) and a AAHP-commissioned analysis which concluded that twenty-
seven cents of every new dollar spent on health care in 2001 was “driven by litigation, government
mandates and regulation and waste, fraud and abuse”).
148. Jensen, supra note 13, at 1336.
149. Id. at 1337.
150. Id. at 1363.
layoffs.”  The corporate constituent groups affected (i.e., the officers,141
directors, employees, and shareholders), may not even be the same groups in
place at the time of the wrongdoing.  Furthermore, fines are likely to be142
passed on to consumers as a cost of doing business.  Thus, society at large143
ends up paying the greatest price, especially in the context of health care, if
MCOs are forced into bankruptcy.
Other scholars argue that litigation aimed at shaping policy, especially in
the public health arena, is not effective.  Public health advocates have144
resorted to litigation in areas of tobacco regulation and gun control, “perhaps
out of frustration with the inability to achieve desired public health goals
through the legislative branch of government.”  ERISA is arguably yet145
another area where the legislative branch has fallen short. However, there is
an important difference: by drastically limiting plaintiffs’ damages, ERISA
has cut off the public health advocates’ litigation alternative to shaping public
policy.  The criminal law therefore seems to be the only litigation146
alternative. But many believe that litigation has had a negative impact on
consumer health and is a primary reason for increased health care costs.  The147
managed care entity was created as a market response to control what seemed
to be uncontrollable health care costs prior to the 1980s.  Ironically, the148
result of large fines from criminal liability may “return Americans to the
system of health care that they rejected [almost thirty] years ago.”  Unlike149
the tobacco manufacturers who marketed a product that they knew was
harmful to the public in order to make a profit, managed care companies
“market a product that helps rather than hurts.”  Targeting such an industry150
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Against Managed Care Plans for Inadequate Care, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 53, 60 (2001).
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158. Jensen, supra note 13, at 1364.
159. See generally Diskant, supra note 114, at 5 (arguing that because prosecutors always win in the
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with litigation in order to shape policy may end up crippling an industry that
undeniably serves a public purpose.151
Furthermore, our Constitution sets roles for each governmental body, and
it is the legislature who is charged with shaping public policy. The courts
should be limited to interpreting those policies.  Courts are ill equipped to152
devise complex regulatory schemes, which would be necessary in the managed
care arena.  The Pegram Court noted that the legislative process is the153
“preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social
value, such as optimum treatment levels and health-care expenditure.”154
Arguably, even the legislature has failed to regulate in this area out of apathy
for the complexity of the healthcare industry. The failure of other branches
often drives litigation as public policy, but such an argument does not make
the courts any more equipped to shape policy.  ERISA may by seen as both155
a failure and a reflection of the legislature allowing itself to be influenced by
the powerful insurance lobby.
While corporate criminal liability still remains controversial, criminal
liability for MCOs is appealing because MCO misconduct has the ability to
inflict tremendous pain and injury, both in terms of human suffering and
financial loss.  “Additionally, because the current tort and regulatory156
penalties apparently have not chilled MCO misconduct, legislators and
prosecutors are looking to criminal prosecutions to vindicate state interests in
the delivery of health care and the protection of citizens.”  However, civil157
litigation can scarcely achieve all the policy goals society seeks. For example,
in tobacco litigation, most states hoped to convince the industry to agree to
vast regulation, advertising cutbacks, and reimbursement; yet, ultimately they
only achieved “pecuniary damages, the goal that litigation is most suited to
provide.”  Criminal prosecution is even less likely to achieve sweeping158
reform.  For example, a former federal prosecutor argues that a corporate159
indictment inevitably leads to a guilty plea, large fines, and more headlines,
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none of which guarantee widespread industry change.  Furthermore, only160
corporations with nothing to lose can afford to contest charges in court.161
These settlements will also likely reflect only the interests of the litigants, and
are thus a poor reflection of the public interest.  It is also worth noting that162
as a result of the tobacco settlement, share prices for tobacco companies
actually rose, resulting in even more profit for the industry.  The benefit of163
any criminal sanctions is therefore quite uncertain.
Perhaps most unfulfilling about imposing criminal sanctions on the
managed care industry is the lack of direction such prosecution provides to
MCOs that are actually looking to structure their companies to avoid such
punishment.  This concern is even greater given the nature of MCOs as for-164
profit entities serving an important public function. Without legislatively
imposed regulations and expectations, MCOs will continue to try to find a
way to operate profitably.
IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS
There is an obvious need for Congress to address the shortcomings of
ERISA. Although the courts have recently been more progressive in avoiding
preemption and allowing more suits to proceed in state court, there are still
many questions about ERISA’s exact limits on the state’s role in health
insurance.  So far, the courts have recognized a “presumption against165
[ERISA] preemption where the statute at issue addresses a historic police
power of the states—namely, a matter of health and safety.”  Some states166
have been testing the boundaries of this presumption through laws aimed at
curbing MCO misconduct.  Statutes like the Texas Health Care Liability Act167
permit lawsuits by individuals against MCOs for damages caused by a failure
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to exercise ordinary care when making health treatment decisions.  The168
Illinois HMO Act provides a right to secure an independent medical review
of what constitutes a medically necessary treatment.  If this independent169
review concludes that a treatment is necessary, the HMO must provide the
service.  The Illinois act was challenged as preempted by ERISA, but the170
Supreme Court rejected the argument.  Although these laws seem to be171
going in the right direction, they are far from sufficient, and it is worth noting
that none of them would have actually helped Nataline Sarkisyan, as her plan
was self-insured and thus not subject to state insurance laws.172
Though failing to go so far as to clarify or amend ERISA, Congress has
responded to the concerns over managed care’s cost containment policies
through several failed bills aimed at establishing a patient bill of rights.173
Though none of these measures passed, a failed version of the bill did help to
facilitate private lawsuits against HMOs and insurance companies by inspiring
states to provide for such causes of action.174
More appropriate than a patient bill of rights establishing a state right to
sue would be a complete Congressional overhaul of ERISA. In the case of
Corporate Health Insurance v. Texas Department of Insurance, the Fifth
Circuit Judge, recognizing that the Supreme Court had “gone as far as it can
go,” urged Congress to act “to further define what rights a patient has when
he or she has been negatively affected by an HMO’s decision to deny medical
care . . . and to enact legislation that ensure[s] every patient has access to that
care.”  Congress should federally mandate independent review procedures175
and provide for such independent review boards in each state. These boards
should be made up of neutral physicians of specified credentials who are not
affiliated with the managed care entity. If the independent review board rules
in an insured’s favor, the services should be provided and the insured should
be reimbursed for any out of pocket costs.  Such determinations should be176
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made swiftly within a statutorily defined time limit, and expedited decisions
should be available in emergency cases like the Sarkisyan case.  If denied,177
such denials should be provided in writing with data supporting the
determination. This independent appeals process should be exhausted before
an insured can bring suit. However, if bodily injury is imminent because of the
denial or delay, Congress should provide a way for insureds to obtain judicial
review of their case.
Furthermore, Congress should adopt a statutory definition of “medical
necessity.”  This definition need not be overly restrictive, as too narrow a178
definition could not possibly be applicable in all cases. Nevertheless, it should
be clear enough so as to provide guidance to MCOs in carving out treatments
under their plans, and some level of statutorily defined deference should be
given to the treating physician.  Finally, ERISA should provide for punitive179
damages in the case of gross deviation from the regulatory requirements.
Because the regulations provide patients with redress before injury, litigation
against MCOs would probably not increase in any unmanageable manner.
CONCLUSION
The criminal prosecution of MCOs will simply not achieve the sweeping
reform of the industry that society hopes to gain through litigation. Whether
it be through patients’ rights legislation or an overhaul of ERISA, it is clear
that Congress needs to act. If Congress seeks to protect the obvious public
benefit that flows from MCOs, it needs to either set standards as to how they
should make or deny treatment decisions or provide a federal review mandate
with a truly independent review board.  Since Congress seems to be180
concerned that uniform laws be applied in the managed care context, it should
establish a uniform review procedure, which would protect the public before
treatment is denied. This would avoid litigation that would likely raise the cost
of health care to the consumer and cripple an industry that, on the whole,
greatly benefits the public.
